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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from appellant's conviction following a 
jury's verdict of guilt after a trial de novo in the circuit 
court. This court is without jurisdiction to hear a further 
appeal of this matter under Utah Code Ann, §77-35-26 (13) (1989). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does Section 77-35-26 (13) apply to this case to deny 
the court of appeals jurisdiction over the matter. Is the 
procedure outlined in 77-35-26 (13) a constitutionally sufficient 
appeal. 
2. Was the circuit court required to instruct the jury on 
the necessity or justification defense. 
3. Did the circuit court err in failing to suppress an 
assisting officer's testimony and certain intoxilyzer documents. 
4. Did the circuit court unlawfully increase appellant's 
sentence imposed in the justice court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Gilberto A. Gonzales, was charged with driving 
under the influence in the justice court. After losing his 
pre-trial motion to instruct the jury, appellant pleaded guilty 
and then appealed to the circuit court. Appellant was convicted 
by the jury in a trial de novo held in the circuit court. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
(1) Utah Const. Art. 1, §12: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right 
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to' have been committed, and the right to appeal 
in all cases, In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
(2) Utah Const. Art. VIII, §1 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a 
supreme court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as 
the district court, and in such other courts as the ligislature by 
statute may establish. The supreme court, the district court, and 
such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of 
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by statute. 
(3) Utah Const. Art. VIII, §5 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all 
matters except as limited by this constituiton or by statute, and 
power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, 
shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally 
with the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of 
right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause. 
(4) Utah Const Art. VIII, §11 
Judges of courts not of record shall be selected in a 
manner, for a term, and with qualification provided by statute. 
However, no qualification may be imposed which requires judges of 
courts not of record to be admitted to practice law. The number 
of judges of courts not of record shall be provided by statute. 
(5) Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 (1989) 
Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on 
direct review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose 
a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense 
based on the same conduct which is more severe than the prior 
sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously 
satisfied. 
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(6) Utah Code Ann. §78-4-7.5 (1989) 
The circuit court has appellate jurisdiction to hear 
trials de novo of the judgments of the justices' courts and trials 
de novo of the small claims department of the circuit court. 
(7) Utah code Ann. §77-35-16(a) (1989) 
Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall 
disclose to the defense upon request the following material or 
information of which he has knowledge: 
1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant or co-defendants; 
2) The criminal record of the defendant; 
3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant or 
co-defendant; 
4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate 
the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or 
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and 
5) Any other item of evidence which the court determines 
on good cause shown should be made available to the defendant in 
order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(8) Utah code Ann. §77-35-26 (2)(a) (1989) 
An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict 
or plea. 
(9) Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26 (13) (a) (1989) 
An appeal may be taken to the circuit court from a 
judgment rendered in the justice court under this rule, except: 
(a) the case shall be tried anew in the cirucit court. 
The decision of the circuit court is final, except when the 
validity or constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is raised 
in the justice court. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent ) 
V •
 t 
GILBERTO A. GONZALES, ] 
Defendant/Appellant J 
) Case No. 890202-CA 
• Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early morning hours of August 4, 1988, Deputy Fred 
Baird, of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, saw a 1975 
Cadillac traveling westbound in the median strip of 3900 South 
(T.37). Deputy Baird stopped the car and identified appellant as 
the driver (T.43). Appellant exhibited signs of intoxication 
including a strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, bloodshot 
eyes, and poor balance (T.44). Appellant also performed poorly on 
field sobriety tests, Deputy Baird arrested appellant for driving 
under the influence of alcohol, a violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§41-6-44 (1988). Subsequently, appellant took an intoxilyzer test 
the results of which were .20 grams (T.50, 63). Appellant also 
admitted being under the influence of alcohol and having consumed 
at least part of the beer in a bar downtown (T.74). 
Proceedings against appellant were initiated before 
Phyllis J. Scott, Justice Court Judge, Second Precinct, Salt Lake 
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County (R.l). In that court, appellant filed a pre-trial motion 
to instruct the jury on the defense of justification. However, 
Judge Scott denied the motion (R.l-2). Appellant then pleaded "no 
contest" to the charge and filed an appeal to the third circuit 
court (R.2) (R.73). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26 (13) (1989), a trial 
de novo was held in the circuit court. As before in the justice 
court, appellant filed a pre-trial motion to instruct the jury on 
the defense of justification (R.84). Judge Maurice Jones refused 
to rule on the motion until after the evidence was presented at 
the trial. During the States case, Deputy Baird testified about 
his observation and arrest of appellant and he opined that 
appellant was under the influence at the time of the stop and 
arrest (T.75). Deputy Davis, an officer who assisted Deputy Baird 
at the time of appellant's arrest, also testified. Deputy Davis 
said he could not remember how appellant performed on the field 
sobriety tests but he did remember that after seeing appellant's 
appearance and performance on those tests, Deputy Davis was of the 
opinion appellant was intoxicated (T.97-98). 
Appellant objected to Deputy Davis1 testimony (T.92) and 
also the admission of the intoxilyzer affidavit, checklist, and 
test result card (T.61-62). Appellant claimed the name of Deputy 
Davis and copies of the documents had not been provided on 
discovery. Judge Jones overruled the objection because appellant 
had not filed a new discovery request in the trial de novo 
proceedings (T.52). Appellant called an expert witness, Sayed 
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Afroz, M.D., who was the psychiatrist who treated appellant's son 
(T.77). In spite of prodding by defense counsel, Dr. Afroz 
refused to say that appellant's son was a danger to himself or 
others either on August 4, 1988, or any time prior to that date 
(T.87) . 
Appellant also testified. He said that his son left the 
house alone frequently. Appellant did say that his son had on one 
occasion tried to swallow something (T.115). However, appellant 
could not point to any specific danger that his son was to himself 
or to anyone else (T.105, 107, 112, 113, 114). 
Appellant further testified that although he had been 
drinking most of the afternoon, when his son failed to return home 
around midnight, appellant did not either call the police or ask 
someone else to drive him in his search for his son (T.114). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, Judge Jones refused to 
give appellant's proposed instruction on the necessity defense 
(T.121). Although the record is not clear on all the grounds the 
court relied upon in its ruling, it is apparent that the court 
determined that a reasonable and legal and alternative to 
appellant violating the law had existed (T.121). The court also 
indicated that appellant had failed to show the presence of a 
specific threat of substantial bodily injury (T.123). 
Although appellant objected to the court's failure to 
instruct the jury on the necessity defense and on the admission of 
certain testimony and items into evidence, appellant did not 
challenge the constitutionality or validity of a statute or 
ordinance during any of the proceedings in the circuit court. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Since appellant did not challenge the validity or the 
constitutionality of the statute or ordinance, in either the 
justice court or in the circuit court on appeal, the court of 
appeals is without jurisdiction to consider this matter. 
Furthermore, the circuit court correctly denied appellant's motion 
to instruct the jury on the defense of justification since 
appellant had failed to make the requisite evidentiary showing. 
The court properly admitted the testimony of Deputy Davis and the 
intoxilyzer documents over appellant's objection since the State 
sufficiently complied with appellant's discovery request. 
Finally, the circuit court did err in imposing a greater cost on 
appellant for attorney's fees but the court was not in error in 
setting a limit in which appellant had to pay those fines and fees 
nor by changing the governmental agency responsible for 
appellant's probation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-35-26 (13) (1989) PROVIDED 
APPELLANT A SUFFICIENT APPEAL FROM HIS JUDGMENT 
OF CONVICTION RENDERED IN THE JUSTICE COURT. 
FURTHERMORE, SINCE APPELLANT DID NOT CHALLENGE 
THE VALIDITY NOR CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 
STATUTE OR ORDINANCE IN EITHER THE JUSTICE OR 
THE CIRCUIT COURT DECISION SECTION 77-35-26 
(13) RENDERS THE DECISION OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
UPON CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL DE NOVO FINAL, AND 
PROHIBITS THE COURT OF APPEALS FROM TAKING 
JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER. 
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Utah Code Ann. §78-4-7.5 (1989) gives appellate 
jurisdiction over justice court judgments to the circuit courts. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26 (13) 1989 dictates that such appellate 
jurisdiction must be exercised by de novo consideration of the 
justice court judgments. Unless the validity or constitutionality 
of a statute or ordinance has been challenged in the justice 
court, the decision of the circuit court on the de novo 
consideration of the case is final and no further appeal is 
possible. 
Appellant argues that such an apppellate procedure 
violates equal protection and due process principles. However, 
appellant assumes too much about the right of appeal. 
The U. S. Constitution does not give a criminal defendant 
any right of appeal. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 77, 31 L.Ed. 
2d. 36 92 S. Ct. 862 (1972). The right exists in Utah only 
because the Utah Constituion explicitly provides for it. Since 
that is the source of the right, the state constitution also 
controls the extent and manner of appeals. 
Utah Const. Art. VIII, Section 5 states that the appellate 
jurisdiction of courts is to be set by statute. There is no 
requirement that appellate jurisdiction be limited to the court of 
appeals or the Supreme Court. This is significant given the 
common definition of the word "appeal." An appeal is defined a 
[A] complaint to a superior court that error has been committed by 
an inferior one." Sheriff, Clark County v. Hatch, 691 P.2d 449 
(Nev. 1984). &££ also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 88 (5th ed. 1979). 
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Apparently there is nothing about the word "appeal" that dictates 
a limited review by a panel or quorum of judges. Logically the 
key should be, not whether the reviewing court is titled an 
"appellate" court but rather whether the reviewing court has the 
authority to correct errors committed in the lower court. In this 
context, the absence of a constitutional mandate that only certain 
courts have appellate jurisdiction makes sense. 
Other wording in Art VIII supports this argument: 
Except for matters filed originally with the 
supreme court, there shall be in all cases an 
appeal of right from the court of original 
jurisdiction to a court with appellate 
jurisdiction over the cause. 
Utah Const. Art VIII, Section 5 (emphasis added). The right of 
appeal then is a right to review by a court with authority to 
correct errors in the lower court and not specifically a review by 
the court of appeals or the Supreme Court. 
The language of the Utah Constitution also dictates the 
extent of the right of appeal. As quoted above, the right only 
provides a criminal defendant with an appeal from the court of 
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction. No 
further appeal to a higher level of appellate court is provided 
for. See Utah Const. Art. VIII, Section 5. 
Given the nature and extent of the right of appeal 
outlined in the Utah Constitution, it is apparent the appellant 
has suffered no limitations of that right. Appellant only has a 
right to review by a court empowered by the legislature with 
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authority to correct errors in the original court. That authority 
was given to the circuit courts. Utah Code Ann. §§77-35-26 (13), 
78-4-7.5. Appellant did appeal to that court and a full 
consideration, with the authority to reverse the justice court 
decision and enter a new verdict, was provided. 
Assuming argumendo that appellant's right of appeal is 
somehow limited, that limitation is the constitutional legislative 
regulation of that right. Appellant challenges the regulation as 
a violation of either the equal protection or due process clauses 
of the U. S. Constitution. However, M[e]ven the existence of a 
general constitutional right to appeal does not preclude 
reasonable legislative regulation and control of the right [to 
appeal]...." Am. Jur. 2d Appeal & Error §1 (1962). As appellant 
concedes in his brief, the limitation does not involve suspect 
classifications or fundamental rights, and therefore, the statute 
regulating and controlling the right of appeal must be up held 
against either an equal protection or a due process challenge if 
it passes the lower levels of scrutiny. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 
U.S. 600, 610, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341, 351, 94 S. Ct. 2437 (1974) 
(Fundamental right to counsel at trial proceeding distinguished 
from right to appeal); Lindsey v. Normet. 405 U.S. at 77 (abitrary 
and capricious standard applied to equal protection challenge of 
limitations on appeal). See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 
12, 17, 100 L.ed. 891, 76 S. Ct. 585, 590 (3 955). But. See 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.23 348, 358 (Utah 1989) 
(Balancing test applied instead of rational basis test in some 
situations). 
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Utah Const. Art. VIII Section 1 states "Courts not of 
record shall also be established by statute." Pursuant to that 
constitutional mandate the Utah Legislature through Utah Code Ann. 
§78-5-101 created justice courts. However, as discussed above, a 
right of appeal even from such a court not of record is required. 
But since the justice courts do not record verbatim the 
proceedings therein, a conventional differential appellant review, 
which is a limited review of the facts from the record, is not 
feasible. 
Moreover, a review of the law applicable to any case only 
makes sense in relationship to the particular facts to which the 
law is applied. The lack of any requirement that justice court 
judges be law trained attorneys also complicates the problem of 
providing an effective appeal. Utah Const. Art. VIII, Section II. 
A complete review of both law and facts in a trial "anew" 
is the only reasonable solution to the problem. Such a review 
allows the appellate court to hear the facts and properly relate 
the law to the facts introduced and the procedure observed. 
This logic also exposes the difficulty with appellant's 
argument. If the de novo review is not a reasonable exercise of 
the right of appeal, then a criminal defendant in a justice court 
would be entitled to a free trial. Meaning an opportunity to be 
found not guilty in the justice court and still not be bound by a 
guilty verdict so long as he filed an appeal. A trial de novo in 
a court of record would still have to be conducted. If the 
criminal defendant still had a full right to appeal to the court 
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of appeals, then the justice court would mean nothing. 
The procedure outlined in Utah Code Ann. §§77-35-26 (13), 
78-4-7.5, is the only reasonable and rational exercise of the 
right of appeal and therefore the limitation, if any, is 
sufficiently related to the legislature purpose to pass 
constitutional scrutiny. 
Appellant, however, argues that Section 77-35-26 (13) does 
not apply to his case because an actual trial on the merits was 
not held in the justice court. He then argues that the circuit 
court proceedings were the only proceedings to be appealed from. 
Appellant's argument is not supported by clear reading of 
all the applicable statutes. Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26 (2)(a) 
states that a defendant may appeal from "the final judgment of 
conviction, whether by verdict or by plea." The judgment of 
conviction is defined as the final conclusion of criminal 
prosecution in a particular court. See State v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 
1125, 1127 (Utah 1985). It is not a finding of guilt alone, but 
rather the judgment and sentence of the court following either the 
plea or the verdict. See State v. Garcia, 659 P.2d 918, 923 
(N.M.App. 1983). 
The language of Section 77-35-26 (2)(a) supports this 
definition of the term "the final judgment of conviction." The 
statute specifically states that a defendant may appeal from the 
judgment of conviction regardless of whether it is based on a plea 
or on a verdict. Such language would be useless if the 
legislature meant that a defendant could appeal from the plea 
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itself, or the from the verdict itself. ££.. Johnson, 700 P.2d 
1127. 
Appellant, however, urges this court to concentrate on two 
words on Section 77-35-26 (13) namely "tried anew" to hold that in 
order to receive appellant's full right to appeal, the trial in 
the circuit court must have been a second trial. Such an argument 
is based on a misunderstanding on what the appellant appealed 
from. As discussed above, that is not the plea nor the verdict, 
but instead, it is the judgment of the lower court. The words 
"tried anew" must therefore refer also to the judgment of 
conviction and logically must also include the proceedings leading 
up to and forming the basis for that judgment but not limited to 
an actual trial. 
Because appellant plead guilty after losing his motion to 
instruct in the justice court, and was sentenced by the justice 
court, that sentence was a judgment of conviction. Because 
appellant did not challenge the constitutionality or the validity 
of the statute or ordinance in either the circuit court, or in the 
justice court, Section 77-35-26 (13) requires the decision of the 
circuit court to be final. City of Monticello, v. Christensen, 
769 P.2d 853 (Utah App. 1989). Furthermore, since that de novo 
review is a constitutionality sufficient appeal, this court is 
without jurisdiction to consider this matter. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE DEFENSE 
OF JUSTIFICATION. 
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Appellant claims that the trial court should have 
instructed the jury on the defense of necessity or justification. 
The State does not disagree that under some circumstances the 
defense of necessity or justification may be available in Utah, 
However, in order for the court to instruct, appellant's evidence 
must be such that it could raise a reasonable doubt in the juries 
mind as to whether the appellant was justified in acting as he 
did. State v. Harding, 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981) (emphasis 
added). Appellant's evidence must be such that it could raise a 
reasonable doubt in the juries mind as to whether the appellant 
was justified in acting as he did. But if there is an alternative 
to violating the law, the defense will fail. 
It is also axiomatic that where the defendant 
has asserted the defense to justify or excuse 
the criminal charge, and where there is a 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support it, 
the viability of the defense then becomes a 
question of fact and the jury should be charged 
regarding. Where, however, there is no 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support the 
defense or its essential components, it is not 
error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct 
£ he i ury as to the defense, or to instruct them 
to disregard it. 
id.(Emphasis added). See also State v. Tuttle, 730 P.2d 630, 635 
(Utah 1986); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410-411 
(1980); United States v. Lewis, 628 F.2d 1276, 1279 (10th Cir. 
1980) . 
In this case neither the appellant, nor his expert 
witness, could testify of any specific imminent harm that faced 
the appellant's son or for that fact anyone else. Furthermore, 
the appellant testified that he made no attempt to call the police 
or summon assistance by any other means. Appellant simply upon 
realizing that his son was late got into his car and went 
looking. The trial judge correctly ruled that appellant had not 
offered any evidence to show that he was without a reasonable 
legal alternative to violating the law. 
Since appellant did not make the proper showing, the court 
correctly declined to instruct the jury of the defense of 
necessity. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY ADMITTING DOCUMENTS AND TESTIMONY WITHOUT 
PRIOR NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT. 
In the justice court proceedings appellant submitted a 
general request for discovery, which included a request for a list 
of the State's witnesses and reports or results of scientific 
tests taken during investigation of the case (R.70). The State 
responded by denying appellant's general request for discovery 
pursuant to State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987) . The 
State's answer indicated that it would provide a copy of the 
police report and a copy of the State's information (R.67). These 
two documents accompanied the State's answer to appellant. The 
police report listed Deputy Ken Davis as an assisting officer 
(R.ll). The report also detailed that a breath test had been 
given to appellant, that Deputy Fred Baird had administered the 
test and that the results of the test were .20 grams (R.12). The 
police report did not include copies of either the intoxilyzer 
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checklist, the test result form, or the intoxilyzer technicians 
affidavit. Appellant did not file a motion to compel discovery 
(R.70 (only request for discovery)), nor did he request a 
continuance upon learning of the States intention to offer the 
items and testimony into evidence. 
Appellant's argument that the court erroneously admitted 
the items and testimony into evidence is not tenable. The State 
did in fact comply with appellant's request for discovery. As 
noted by the appellant in his brief, the applicable provisions of 
appellant's request are paragraph number two and paragraph number 
six (R.70). Paragraph number two requested a list of States 
witnesses. Paragraph number six requested the reports or results 
of scientific tests taken during the investigation of the case. 
As outlined above, the police reports clearly listed both Deputy 
Fred Baird and Deputy Ken Davis as the arresting and assisting 
officer. Furthermore, the police reports also detailed the 
circumstances and the results of the only scientific test 
performed during the investigation of the case, the intoxilyzer 
test. 
The State is only obligated to provide discovery upon 
request by a defendant. Utah Code Ann. §7-35-16 (a) (1989). 
Furthermore, if the State voluntarily responds to the defendant's 
request, the State must either "produce all of the material 
requested or must identify explicitly those portions of the 
request with respect to which no responsive material will be 
provided" Knight, 734 P.2d at 917. In this case the State 
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specifically denied each of appellant's requests. Instead, the 
State stated that it would provide only a copy of the police 
reports in its file and a copy of the information against the 
defendant- Therefore, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the 
State was under no obligation to specifically list the witnesses 
it intended to call at the trial nor provide further documents 
concerning the performance of the intoxilyzer test. 
If appellant had wanted a more detailed list of witnesses 
he should have made a request for a court order under Section 
77-35-16 (a)(5). See Knight, 734 P.2d at 916. Furthermore, if 
appellant had wanted the documents associated with the intoxilyzer 
test he should not have asked alternatively for either the 
documents or the test results. I&. at 917 (Before defendant can 
claim to have been misled by the prosecutions discovery response, 
the discovery request must be sufficiently specific to permit the 
prosecutor to understand what is sought.) 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ILLEGALLY INCREASE PARTS OF 
THE SENTENCE GIVEN THE APPELLANT BY THE JUSTICE 
COURT. HOWEVER, OTHER PARTS WERE NOT ILLEGALLY 
INCREASED. 
Appellant contests three parts of the sentence imposed by 
Judge Jones in the circuit court. In each, appellant claims that 
the sentence given by Judge Jones was harsher than the one imposed 
by the justice court. 
The State does not dispute that Utah Code Ann. §76-3-405 
(1989) applies to the new sentence imposed by the circuit court 
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after a de novo review of justice court proceedings. Furthermore, 
the State does not contest that the incease of the costs imposed 
on appellant for legal counsel was in error. 
Appellant argues, however, that the judge also erred by 
setting the time in which the fines and fees had to be paid, and 
by placing appellant on supervised probation. Even assuming, 
argumendo, that Judge Jones could not have decreased the time in 
which the appellant had to pay the fine, appellant's argument that 
Judge Jones erred still fails. The docket entry shows that the 
justice court judge simply put off consideration of any payment 
schedule for the fines and fees until after expiration of the 30 
day stay of execution simultaneously granted to allow the 
appellant to appeal (R.2). Apparently since appellant did in fact 
appeal, the justice court did not have an opportunity to finish 
the sentence. Therefore, Judge Jones was the first judge to 
consider that part of the sentence. Accordingly, his ruling that 
appellant must pay within sixty days was not an alteration of any 
prior sentence. 
Finally, appellant's argument that the change from 
unsupervised to a supervised probation made the second sentence 
more severe is also without merit. Appellant simply asserts that 
the change must be more severe. Yet he makes no factual or legal 
argument why it is so. Section 76-3-405 just requires that the 
second sentence should be no more severe than the first, but it 
does not expressely prohibit a change in the sentence. State v. 
Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981) states; "The second 
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sentence cannot exceed the first in appearance or effect, in the 
number of its elements, or in their magnitude." (Citations 
ommitted.) The second sentence imposed by the circuit court did 
not require appellant to follow additional conditions imposed on 
his probation by the Alcohol Counseling and Education Center. 
Instead, the court just ordered the probation to be supervised by 
that organization. What exactly that means is unclear. As long 
as the change in the sentence did nothing more than change the 
governmental unit responsible for appellant, the change should not 
be deemed to have increased the sentence. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Since appellant did not challenge the validity or the 
constitutionality of the statute or ordinance, in either the 
justice court or in the circuit court on appeal, the court of 
appeals is without jurisdiction to consider this matter. 
Furthermore, the circuit court correctly denied appellant's motion 
to instruct the jury on the defense of justification since 
appellant had failed to make the requisite evidentiary showing. 
The court properly admitted the testimony of Deputy Davis and the 
intoxilyzer documents over appellant's objection since the State 
sufficiently complied with appellant's discovery request. Finally, 
the circuit court did err in imposing a greater cost on appellant 
for attorneys fees but the court was not in err in setting a limit 
in which appellant had to pay those fines and fees nor by changing 
the governmental agency responsible for appellant's probation. 
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The State respectfully requests the court of appeals to 
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Alternatively the 
State requests the court of appeals to affirm appellant's 
conviction but to remand the case back to the circuit court for 
adjustments in the sentence. 
Respectfully submitted thisTx J? day of March, 1990. 
DAVID E. YQ 
Salt Lake^Cun^y 
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